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Loads On Reference

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I. The Proposal

Consider simple subject-predicate sentences in English. The subject part, a noun phrase (NP), may be syntactically¹ complex or simple. When it is complex, it will contain a *descriptive phrase*: ‘a/an F’ ‘some F’, ‘all Fs’, ‘the F’, ‘very few Fs’, ‘many Fs’ etc. as well as ‘this/that F’, ‘those Fs’ and the like. The hallmark of such phrases is syntactically obvious: they have a determiner (or, a quantifier) followed by a common noun, a one- place predicate. When the NP is syntactically simple, however, there is just one possibility, viz., it is a name *phrase* containing a proper name (ignoring pronouns). The descriptive phrases contain a general term ‘F’ while the name phrases don’t.

Given this stark contrast between descriptive phrases and name phrases in terms of syntax, we will expect this contrast to have some effect on the meaning and use of such phrases; we will expect, for example, that the syntactic contrast simulates a parallel contrast in meaning and use. Such expectations, though sometimes rejected by some classical philosophers of language (Russell 1905), seem fairly straight-forward. If the meaning and use of a sentence is not strongly governed by its syntax, it is difficult to see how the sentence was learnt and understood by the native speaker in the first place (Jackendoff 1983). If he didn’t follow the syntax, what computational resources did he use? How did he connect structure with meaning?²

In what follows I will argue, in some detail, that there are features in the meaning and use of the listed phrases which *do* obey the syntactic constraint. I will suggest, in particular, that there is a sharp distinction between *loaded reference* and *unloaded reference* which applies exclusively to descriptive phrases. The availability of this distinction for descriptive phrases and its non-availability for name phrases thus marks out the required syntactic distinction.

II. The Current Scene

The original Conflation between name phrases and descriptive phrases, as understood here, has often been attributed (e.g., by Kripke 1972) to Frege (1892) and to Russell (1905). Frege suggested that ordinary proper names have senses and Russell thought that ordinary proper names often behave as if they are denoting phrases.³ Given that singular definite descriptions are suitable candidates for Fregean senses and that definite descriptions are denoting phrases *par excellence*, the conflation between names and descriptions, according to Kripke, follows at once. Kripke himself resisted the conflation by suggesting that ordinary proper names are rigid designators while singular definite descriptions, typically, are non-rigid. It *seemed* that the rigid/non-rigid distinction is enough to uphold the syntactic constraint.

The situation, however, isn’t all that clear. First, it is difficult to see that the notion of non-rigid designators, unlike Russell’s notion of denoting phrases, is able to pick out the entire syntactic class; it isn’t even clear that typical quantified phrases, with the exception of definite descriptions, are designators at all. Secondly the concept of rigidity seems to apply almost without fail to demonstrative phrases of the form ‘this/that F’ as well as to some untypical definite descriptions, e.g., those containing essential predication. It has been justly complained (Almog 1986), therefore, that Kripke’s distinction fails to capture the distinction between naming and describing even if we restrict the notion of describing to singular definite descriptions.

Matters were further complicated by Donnellan (1966) and Putnam (1975). Donnellan suggested that even typical definite descriptions have two distinct uses; a name-like use (referential use) and a denoting-like use (attributive use). We will have much more to say about Donnellan's distinction below. Putnam went to the extent of suggesting that the entire category of natural kind terms are rigid designators and are, therefore, name-like, demonstrative-like and untypical-definite-description-like. Kaplan (1979) wondered whether *all* predicates are rigid designators. Things have become pretty mixed up from the syntactic point of view.

Many elements of the preceding picture are currently under dispute (Donnellan 1983, Almog 1986). I have no space here for evaluating these, largely internal, disputes. Yet, the central point has already been made: current discussions in philosophy of language have failed to suggest a framework in which the syntactic constraint could be strictly obeyed. The distinctions so far suggested are either too thickly grained or cross-grained from the syntactic point of view.

I will assume that such theories have a completely valid beginning with their analysis of proper names. Over the years, people have come to view proper names as something akin to Russell's notion of a logically proper name. Under this view, proper names are (Millian) tags referring directly to the referred object without the intermediaries of Fregean senses in the head. A large agreement on this view is indeed a major gain from recent discussions on language. I have no quarrel with this view since it already captures one-half of the syntactic constraint. However, it is one thing to agree about proper names and quite another to agree to assimilate almost the entire referential apparatus of a language under a single view facilitated only by proper names. I have thus no objection to theories of direct reference if they are restricted just to where they began, viz., proper names. The troubles begin as soon as the theories leave their nest and begin to cover demonstratives, some definite descriptions, varieties of predicates and much else. The assimilation of proper names with syntactically diverse elements such as demonstratives, definite descriptions and varieties of predicates via their common linguistic functioning (e.g. rigid designation) has been sometimes explained recently by appealing to a radically new picture. In this picture, terms are classified into two broad classes: descriptive devices and genuine naming devices. Genuine naming devices are those terms whose only semantic value, given a context, are the objects designated by such terms. A genuine naming device, when used as the subject term of a simple subject-predicate sentence, yields a *singular proposition*. Theories which give an account of the generation of *singular propositions* for various classes of terms are sometimes called theories of *Direct Reference*.

Notice that the entire picture is built up from a semantic idea, i.e., designated objects supply the only semantic value to the designating terms. Hence, it is no wonder that the syntactic differences between terms which yield singular propositions are of no particular consequence so long as the terms share the stated semantic picture.⁴ Theories of direct reference, thus, in a way, supply a direct contrast to the aim of this paper.

As we saw briefly, notions like rigidity are not fine enough to uphold *just* the view of proper names and that there is no available framework to exclude, say, the demonstrative phrases, from this view.

What we need then is a framework which focusses exclusively on the category of descriptive phrases as syntactically characterized *while* upholding the no-sense view of proper names. The framework should be such as to maintain the required distinction between name phrases and descriptive phrases while explaining at the same time why, say, the demonstrative phrases have an intuitive pull towards proper names. The distinction between loaded/unloaded reference, I believe, is sufficient to accomplish this task. to which I devote the rest of this paper.

III. The Distinction

A central point for the distinction is that sentences with descriptive phrases in the subject position do not wear their meanings on their sleeves. Consider

- (1) The number of planets is odd.

Suppose a group of theoretical physicists, who characteristically care little about observational data, announce (1) from a detailed calculation of perturbation equations and the like, to suggest that the number of planets is $2n+1$, whatever n may be. To suggest this is not to suggest that (1) may be satisfied by any number whatsoever. The claim is that the physicists do not have a specific particular number in mind whatever may be the theoretical restriction on the range of n the physicists have. Within this agreed restricted range, no particular number has been picked out to satisfy (1). I will say that the physicists are using the phrase "The number of planets" in an *unloaded way* and that the reference of "The number of planets" is *unloaded*.

I will not get into the largely verbal question of whether the physicists are using ‘The number of planets’ to refer at all. In saying (1) and in claiming (1) to be true, i.e., in claiming the world to be so, the physicists are talking about something, viz., the number of planets. In that sense, in one good sense of “referring”, the physicists are referring. I think, therefore, that it is prudent not to touch the concept of referring itself and to draw the distinction *within* the phenomenon of referring.

Someone, on the other hand, may go out, use a telescope, look at the planets and find that there are, say, 9 of them and announce (1). One may imagine a scenario in which this person was requested to find out whether the number of planets is odd by actually counting the planets and reporting accordingly. (1) is the report. I will say that this person is using ‘The number of planets’ in a *loaded* way and that the reference of ‘The number of planets’ is *loaded*.

There are, then, occasions in which sentences such as (1) need to be disambiguated, perhaps in the following manner:

- (1) The number of planets, whatever it is, is odd
- (2) The number of planets, being 9, is odd.

Thus the same sentence has been used on two vastly different circumstances embedding vastly different background stories. These stories need to be appreciated to capture the intentions of the speaker and the astronomical conditions to which he wants to draw the hearer’s attention. On the first occasion of its use, (1) is claimed to be true in a general way, given the range; on the second occasion, it is claimed to be true for a particular object, viz., the number 9. If in doubt about this example, consider a more familiar example,

- (1) The murderer of Smith is insane.

Suppose someone uses (2) solely on the basis of the brutality of the murder; he would be using ‘The murderer of Smith’ in an unloaded way. On the other hand, if someone uses (2) on seeing Jones and his weird behaviour when Jones was caught red-handed at the scene, he would be using the phrase in a loaded way. The references of ‘The murderer of Smith’ would thus be unloaded and loaded respectively depending upon the circumstances.⁵

As a starter, then, a crucial feature of the distinction is, whether or not, in using a definite description, the user has a particular object of a certain sort in mind to which he wants to draw the hearer’s attention. In an unloaded use, the user simply wishes to talk about whatever satisfies a given descriptive phrase in a general way; in the loaded use, the user has some particular object satisfying a given descriptive phrase in mind. A descriptive phrase needs to be satisfied on both the cases, but it is satisfied in different ways. We may think of the loaded use as carrying an object along with a description that fits the object; in the unloaded use, just the description is carried. Given the standard interpretation of the definite article, whatever is carried in each case, of course, is unique.⁶

IV. The Nature of the Distinction

I do not wish to pretend that the preceding account of the distinction is clear and watertight. For example, one may complain about the vagueness of the notion of ‘having something in mind’. Nevertheless, a full clarification of the distinction, though eminently desirable, is not the immediate task at hand. The task at hand is to see whether the load distinction, warts and all, can be applied to phrases much beyond the initial case for singular definite descriptions. My hope is that getting clear about the proper range of application of a distinction may be a good way of getting clear about the distinction itself. Theoretical questions regarding the nature of a linguistic phenomenon suitably arise, perhaps, after a good grasp of the phenomenon since we cannot rule out the possibility that current theoretical machinery may not be adequate to handle the phenomenon.

In the present case, I have just taken the first step towards showing that there is a general non-syntactic distinction. Suppose, given the current theoretical climate, someone were to ask at once: is the distinction semantic or is it pragmatic? The very asking of this question presupposes that clear criteria for notions such as ‘semantic’ and ‘pragmatic’ are available for application in the face of linguistic phenomenon.

As a matter of fact, the situation is not all that clear. In one sense of “semantic”, we say that a linguistic phenomenon is semantic if the meanings of the words contribute in a systematic way to the meaning and truth of the sentences. In that sense, the load distinction is semantic. There is no anomaly in either of the uses of (1) and (2). Each word contributes to the meaning and truth of the sentences in perfectly standard ways on both occasions of their uses. Intuitively, it also seems that not quite the same thing is said about the world on these differing occasions as evidenced, for example, by the disambiguated versions (1)’ and (1)’’ of (1).

However, on a different, Tarskian, reading of the situation, the sentence (1), given context-relativisation, says precisely the same thing about the world on either occasion. What it says is captured by the following Tarskian schema:

‘The number of planets is odd’ is true if and only if the number of planets is odd.

On differing occasions of its use, (1) may be saying it in different *ways*, may be with the backing of different sorts of *evidence*, but what it says is precisely the same. One could use the sentence

(2) John admires Shakespeare

in two different *ways* based on different sorts of evidence (e.g., one use based on John’s explicitly saying so and the other based on John’s frequent citations from Shakespeare), yet what (3) says on either occasion is precisely the same. However, it is not clear at all that the difference in the two uses of, say, (1) is of this sort. How do we decide?

One way to decide whether a sentence is genuinely semantically ambiguous is to find at least one ambiguous word in the sentence (“bank”, “rich”, “dumb” etc.). Now we can clearly say that the two uses differ in what they say since ‘the disambiguated versions differ in truth-value on particular occasions of use. Given context-relativisation, a particular use of

(3) John went to the bank

can’t be true for both the readings (river-bank, commercial-bank) of “bank”, showing that “bank” is semantically ambiguous. Since this analysis will not apply to the disambiguated versions of (1), the load distinction fails to meet a standard semantic criteria. This amounts at most to the claim that words in (1) are not semantically ambiguous in the same manner as is “bank”. But what is the argument that the ambiguity of “bank” displays the upper bound of what should count as a *semantic* ambiguity? Aren’t we glorifying one sort of instance to a general claim about the functioning of languages?

Looked at from the other, pragmatic, side as well, the theoretical situation is far from convincing. Since we agreed that words in either of the uses of (1) have been used in perfectly standard ways, one sort of pragmatic effect (metaphors, local colouring and the like) is immediately ruled out. Both the uses also carry the same (pragmatic) force/mood. Moreover, none of the words in either of the uses carry context-relativisation in the way in which it is carried by the different uses of “I” for example; thus, we cannot explain the differences in the uses of (1) in terms of such parameters as speaker-relativisation.

Much more needs to be said on these matters. Even then the preceding preliminary remarks suggest that the ambiguity of (1) fits neither the core cases of semantic ambiguity nor the core cases of pragmatic ambiguity. It is quite possible, therefore, that the current notions of ‘semantics’ and ‘pragmatics’ do not cut the non-syntactic operations of languages at the correct joints. Faced with data such as

(1) and (2), it may be too early to expect a satisfactory answer to the question whether the load distinction is semantic or pragmatic. Hence my appeal that we wait till we get more of the phenomenon in view, till we are able to see the upper and the lower bounds of the distinction itself.

V. Donnellan’s Distinction

The load distinction and the related discussion have, of course, been inspired by Keith Donnellan’s classic work (Donnellan 1966) and Saul Kripke’s important response (Kripke 1979) to this work. However, in this section, I will try to show that the load distinction differs from Donnellan’s distinction in some crucial respects. I need this discussion for the following reasons: (a) to prevent the possible misreading that this paper is merely an attempt to re-interpret and extend Donnellan’s distinction and (b) to prepare some ground for my ultimate disagreement with the view that there is a sense in which proper names and some of the descriptive phrases serve an identical function, a view of which Donnellan is one of the founders.

Donnellan argued that singular definite descriptions can be used in two radically different ways. Consider once again

(2) The murderer of Smith is insane.

As Donnellan has told the background stories, the phrase ‘The murderer of Smith’ in (2) is used *attributively* when someone uses it solely on the basis of the brutality of the murder. The user does not have any particular murderer in mind and his intentions may be captured with a “whoever-he-is” clause: the murderer of Smith, whoever he is, is insane. So far then “unloaded use” is another title for “attributive use”.

The difference comes with what Donnellan calls the *referential* uses of the same phrases. According to Donnellan, ‘The murderer of Smith’ is used referentially when someone uses it to refer to some (alleged) murderer, say Jones, during the trial. This use, according to Donnellan, is one of the many devices for ‘picking out’ Jones since ‘The murderer of Smith’ ‘picks out’ Jones even if Jones is, or later found to be, innocent, i.e., even if Jones is not the murderer of Smith. The success of the use in this case is not

dependent on what may be called the *semantic reference* (Kripke 1979) of the phrase since the meaning of the descriptive phrase, apparently, does not contribute to the success of reference. This, in turn, seems to show that, insofar as just the phenomenon of ‘picking out’ is concerned, it does not matter, given the correct setting, whether or not the descriptive phrase has been used to refer in accordance with its meaning.

This strikingly novel notion of referential use has justly been controversial throughout. It is not at all clear just which aspect of language use is revealed by Donnellan’s data. However, this much at least is clear: the notion of attributive/unloaded uses is comparatively straight-forward and another notion is required to contrast with it. In order to reach such a contrast, Donnellan is pointing at *two* features of his data among many: (a) a descriptive phrase is used to refer to a *particular* object and (b) this reference *may* be achieved in a non-descriptive way. Donnellan obviously feels that these two features are linked such that the notion of a referential use is guided by *both*. However, I am not sure that it must be so.

The hallmark of attributive uses, we saw, is the ‘who/whatever-it-is’ clause, the clause which suggests that the reference/denotation for such uses is achieved without the speaker having a particular object in mind. Now, for such uses, it so happens that, since the speaker and his audience do not have access to any other cognitive resources (e.g., direct acquaintance), whatever reference is thus achieved must be achieved in accordance with the meaning of the phrase since the meaning, in this case, carries the only information about the world.

It follows that, minimally, a contrast with the attributive uses must contrast with the ‘whatever-it-is’ clause to suggest that, in a referential use, the user has a particular object in mind. Since an adequate contrast with the attributive uses has already been reached, the load distinction seeks to capture *only* this contrast. For this minimal contrast, it is quite irrelevant whether the meaning of the general term of a descriptive phrase in a referential use contributes to the achievement of reference or not. After all, the use of “The murderer of Smith”, in the setting described for its referential use, continues to be referential even if Jones is, or later found to be, guilty.⁷ Thus, there wouldn’t be a collapse of the two uses even if a particular F is picked out *via* the content of “F”.

Why then should we need to add the feature (b) to the contrast which is already available via item (a) above? This query seems all the more legitimate since the addition creates problems in at least three different directions, (i) Not all data, such as (I) with *its* background stories, need display the additional feature; hence, the addition of the feature will affect the generality of the phenomenon, (ii) The addition of the feature will further cloud the issues raised in the previous section; we might find it difficult to decide, for example, whether the contrast is a stable linguistic phenomenon at all. (iii) The addition of the feature forces assimilation of definite descriptions with any other item - proper names, for example - which shares the feature; it will affect, as we know by now, the syntactic constraint. The minimal distinction, as captured in the load distinction, avoids all these pitfalls. It seems prudent, then, to keep the *linguistic* distinction to the minimal load distinction and to give a *cognitive* explanation of the rest of the features of Donnellan’s examples (e.g., similarity in perception, common background knowledge and expectations etc.).

Just to recapitulate, Donnellan is running *two* distinctions into one, *viz.*, the load distinction *and* the distinction between *descriptive/ non-descriptive* uses. Kripke (1978) has argued powerfully that the second distinction is pragmatic and is *generalisable* at least to “Some” phrases and proper names. Kripke’s arguments thus substantiate points (ii) and (iii) above. As an aside, notice that Kripke’s arguments may suggest that, since the load distinction by itself is not pragmatic in the Kripke-way, the load distinction, for all we know, may be semantic. We will see that further evidence about the differences between the two distinctions that Donnellan runs into one will be found when we contrast Kripke’s generalisation with our own purported generalisation of the load distinction for all and only descriptive phrases. We will see all that when we get proper names.

Apart from the feature of non-descriptiveness, Donnellan has sometimes (Donnellan 1966: 282, 287 etc.) insisted on another feature of his distinction which I also find to be quite unnecessary for the load distinction. Given that implicit clauses such as ‘being a particular object’ and ‘whichever-it-is’, which mark out the distinction, are not built-in to the phrases themselves, Donnellan has sometimes claimed that different/dual uses can be found for the same sentence. This claim, we saw, helps to dramatize the point of Donnellan’s distinction. Beyond the drama, it is unclear whether this claim is theoretically required by Donnellan.⁸ The claim, as Donnellan observes, will certainly not apply to contexts such as ‘The F does not exist’. But we may decide to treat such contexts as falling outside the scope of Donnellan’s distinction since the phrase ‘The F’ is used in such contexts in a non-referring way. Hence the use of ‘The F’ is neither attributive nor referential. So the claim is that, when the uses of ‘The F’ *are* referring, we can always find dual uses. I do not see whether or why Donnellan requires even this qualified claim.

Supposing, for the sake of argument, this to be one of Donnellan's claims, it seems to fail for phrases like 'The man over there'. Given the rather specific information carried by the indexical, how can there be an attributive use of this phrase? Since Donnellan has not supplied any theoretical arguments in support of the point under discussion, the establishment or the rejection of the point will depend on the ingenuity with which one may construct examples here. Thus, Banks Tapscott has suggested (in conversation) the following example in support of Donnellan. Two detectives are investigating the scene of a crime long after the crime was committed. Locating a footprint near the window, one of them says.

(4) The man over there must have been the lookout.

The speaker obviously does not have a particular man in mind; so this use of 'The man over there' is attributive according to our criterion. Despite Tapscott's ingenuity, I think the force of the example disappears under further analysis. (Hint: does the indexical "over there" attach to "man" or to "footprints"? Compare: 'The animal that left *these* pawprints' (Partee 1979: 208).

So we must settle for different uses, period. Phrases may have a loaded use or an unloaded use or both. In the most favorable circumstances, we might find, with varying degrees of clarity, different uses for the same sentences, as we saw. On other occasions, we might find the same phrase being differently used in different sentences. Among these, the more favorable ones will supply a 'natural' reading for one use rather than the other. Thus, there is a 'natural' unloaded reading (Martin 1984) of 'The President' in

(5) The President has lived in the White House since 1800, while there is a 'natural' loaded reading in

(6) The president has been married since 1945.

On other unfavorable occasions, we may find different uses for different phrases. I hope to show that this point, i.e., some phrases may happen to have just the loaded use, will become crucial in the end.

VI. Further Descriptive Phrases

Returning to the basic aim of this paper, I need to show, minimally, that a sentence exists for each type of descriptive phrase beyond singular definite descriptions where background stories bringing out the distinction can be told. Further, I need to show that such stories cannot be told for name phrases.

So far, I have illustrated the distinction just for singular definite descriptions. This enabled me to compare and contrast the load distinction with Donnellan's. However, there is nothing in the load distinction (or, for that matter, in Donnellan's distinction) to restrict its application to *singular* definite descriptions. With a slight adjustment in the background stories, the distinction goes through for the different uses of

(7) The murderers of the Smith family are insane.

We just have to recall any famous mass-murder of our choice. Now Russell, for one, thought (Russell 1919:167) that there is such a vast difference, from the point of view of his theory of descriptions, between singular descriptions and plural descriptions that they need to be handled in separate chapters. If Russell is correct, then we already have some idea of the generality of the load distinction.

One place predicates, "F"s, typically occur with quantifiers: "A/An F", "Some F", "All F". Given the recent interest in a distinction between "A" and "Some" (Wilson 1978), we need to show that the load distinction appears for each of them. If we are successful in doing that, a search for cases covering 'complex' quantifiers - "Almost all F", "A few F", "Many F", "Most but not all F", etc. is likely to follow a general pattern already established by the primary quantifiers. Further, as we shall see, the distinction has nothing to do with the quantifier/determiner part of the descriptive phrases. Hence I ignore 'complex' quantifiers.

"A"

Suppose an owner of a plantation in Africa comes upon a scene of devastation in a part of his plantation bordering the forest. From the nature of the devastation, analogous to the nature of the crime in (2), he announces

(8) A rogue elephant is causing havoc.

Since he does not have a particular elephant in mind, the truth of (9) will be determined solely from what we ordinarily know about rogue elephants and the nature of the havoc they cause; "A rogue elephant" has been used in an unloaded way. On the other hand, forest officials may actually have information of a certain elephant being driven out from, its herd. They might issue (9) as a warning to the local population; the phrase "A rogue elephant" would be used in a loaded way in the warning.

There may be a feeling that the dual uses of (9) may be captured without invoking the load distinction. It may be thought, for example, that these differences show, at most, that the unloaded use amounts to

existential generalisation while the other is not. Even if this suggestion is correct,⁹ it will not affect the point here, for, the load distinction may be an *explanation* of how to decide whether a context is open to quantification. This may be a lesson from Donnellan's claim that Russell's theory, whose hallmark is that sentences with definite descriptions in the subject position are existential sentences, applies only to the attributive/unloaded uses of definite descriptions, if at all.

"Some"

On hearing a certain sound one night, I might say

(9) Some person is knocking at the door.

According to our criterion, this use of "Some person" is surely unloaded since as I have no particular person in mind, I have no idea who¹⁰ is knocking at the door. My use of "Some person", on that occasion, is wholly dependent on the nature of the knocking (sound) I hear. In this use, (10) will be false only if the knocking sound cannot be linked to any human being at all, e.g., if the sound is due to the rattling of a tree-branch on the door.

There is at least another use of (10) which differs quite radically from the preceding unloaded use. I might be knowing who is at the door in the sense of having a particular person in mind, but want to keep it as a surprise for my audience. I am using "Some person" in the sense of "some person and I am not telling you who" (Strawson 1950:342). A slightly different use will be when I know who but I am too embarrassed to say who (Kripke 1979:17). Both Strawson and Kripke label such uses of "Some F" as "arch" uses. Arch uses of "Some F" are loaded - and to that extent, referential - even when, as Kripke points out, explicit definite descriptions are outlawed from a language. Indeed, according to Kripke, such arch uses might become standard in a language which does not contain the definite article.

It is interesting to note that, so far, Kripke's intuitions about Donnellan's referential use exactly parallel mine regarding loaded use - misdescriptions/misidentifications are simply ignored. However, when it comes to proper names, Kripke's intuitions take a sharp turn creating problems which I discuss below in the next section.

Suppose that one late evening we happen to find a show on T.V. which we think is eminently suitable for children. We express our consternation thus, "why are they showing it now?"

(10) All children are asleep.

With the background knowledge that children usually go to bed much earlier, we are thinking about children in general; this use of

(11) goes through even if *we* do not have any children. According to our criterion, "All children" has been used in an unloaded way. On the other hand, most normal uses of (11) are loaded uses: "Let's start the party now. All children are asleep".

The last example would probably sound slightly artificial; aren't we supposed to say, "All *the* children are asleep"? By the qualification established in the last section, this slight change in the descriptive phrase does not affect the point of the distinction. Nevertheless, let me try the following. Suppose, Case 1 I am a bachelor and I win a big lottery. Suppose again, Case 2: John is married, has three children and he wins a big lottery. Wouldn't our saying "All my children will go to university" have the correct unloaded and loaded readings respectively depending on the case?

The aim of this paper was to show that the load distinction is a general property of *all and only* descriptive phrases. Suppose we grant, with the preceding evidence, that the "all"-part of the thesis is already covered. In order to cover the "only"-part, I have to show that the load distinction has no application for non-descriptive phrases. What would be a plausible counter-example to the "only" part?

VII. Proper Names

Actually, I haven't yet considered the "all"-part duly since I am yet to cover demonstrative phrases. This is a tricky issue calling for a contrast which can only be achieved in the next section after I have considered proper names in this section. I will just raise the issue quickly and leave it for proper analysis in the next section.

In one sense, the load distinction for demonstrative phrases can be displayed easily. Consider (Kripke 1979:11),

(12) That bastard is insane.

Point to a bastard and we have the loaded use of "that bastard". Now read "that bastard" elaborately as "that bastard - the murderer of Smith, whoever he is" and we have an unloaded use. The trouble is, the use of "that" has varied sufficiently between the two readings to suggest that I am not dealing with the same expression. "That" in the first use is the standard demonstrative which is accompanied by a pointing gesture; in the second, "that bastard" refers anaphorically via a definite description and steals the latter's

unloaded reading. There is a clear intuition that only the first use is genuinely demonstrative and that use displays just the load-part of the distinction. Is this enough to say that the load distinction applies to genuine demonstrative phrases? The evidence so far suggests nothing decisive either way. So ideally I will require another contrast between phrases where just the load-part of the distinction is available and phrases where it is not available at all. Will proper names supply that contrast?

So the issue of the demonstrative phrases converges with the testing of the “only”-part with name phrases. But here I face another methodological problem. I certainly wish to maintain that the load distinction does not apply to proper names; so I am maintaining that suitable examples displaying the distinction cannot be constructed. The only way I can maintain this is to take up an example suggested by someone *else* and argue that the example is not suitable. Then, by considering the features of the example, I may be in a position to say why the construction of suitable examples for proper names is theoretically unsound. Fortunately, the literature provides for such examples in an indirect way.

Beginning with a distinction between what he calls “simple cases” and “complex cases”, Kripke (1979:15) has argued that his distinction is “nothing but” Donnellan’s distinction. Further, for Kripke, “the distinction of simple and complex cases will apply to proper names just as much as to definite descriptions”. It seems to me that Kripke’s argument, when suitably oriented to my purposes, may be used to suggest that proper names are plausible counter-examples to our thesis. This is because, as I argued above (section V), Donnellan’s distinction *contains* the load distinction as a part. As yet, there is no indication that Kripke’s distinction is not supposed to apply to Donnellan’s distinction taken as a whole; therefore, there is a possibility that Kripke’s distinction may apply to parts of Donnellan’s distinction. Here is Kripke’s argument.

Suppose someone uses “Jones” in saying
(13) Jones is raking leaves.

In the idiolect of the speaker shared by his hearer, Jones is the semantic reference of “Jones”. In a simple case, the speaker’s specific intention is simply to refer to the semantic referent, i.e., Jones. In a complex case, the speaker uses ‘Jones’ with the specific intention to refer to the man over there raking leaves. The speaker wishes to refer to the man over there but believes that the man over there is Jones. If the speaker’s belief fails, i.e., if Smith, instead of Jones, is raking leaves over there, the speaker’s referent and the semantic referent will not coincide. The use of ‘Jones’ in the simple case, for Kripke, is an attributive/unloaded(?) use; the use in the complex case is a referential use. The argument, as far as I can see and as Kripke justly claims, is totally independent of any particular view of proper names. Let me explain the importance of this last point for our thesis.

Notice that if one held something like a disguised description theory of proper names, then drawing Donnellan’s distinction for proper names is no big news, Kripke or no Kripke; the distinction for proper names obtains via the distinction for some (or other) definite description. But, since Kripke’s argument is neutral with respect to a view of proper names, we are free to hold any view of proper names and are still able to draw Donnellan’s - and possibly our own - distinction for them. This is the interest of Kripke’s argument for our thesis.

Now suppose we hold a Millian view of proper names (Kripke 1972, Donnellan 1972 etc.), the view in which the semantic content of a proper name is exhausted by the bearer. I, like many others, take this view to be necessarily a non-descriptive view of proper names. We suppose this view to hold not only for proper names such as “Saul Kripke” but also for ‘The White House’. The semantic content of ‘The White House’ is *not* the white house, but The White House. If Kripke can still draw the distinction for ‘The White House’, without routing it via the white house, he has a possible counter-example to our thesis.¹¹

I think there is a *prima facie* intuition that Kripke’s distinction between simple and complex cases is very different from the load distinction. One essential feature of Kripke’s example is that Smith be (possibly) *misidentified* for Jones. Kripke sets up a very nice pragmatic framework - the distinction between specific and general intentions - to explain the misidentification. Yet, as I argued at length above (section V), misdescription and or misidentification is not an essential feature of the load distinction though it is an essential feature of the *other* part of Donnellan’s distinction. Therefore, I can dissociate myself from Kripke by making this point explicit, i.e., by showing that Kripke’s simple/complex distinction pertains only to the second half of Donnellan’s distinction but does not pertain to the first half.

In order for Kripke’s distinction to be “nothing but” the load distinction, we must agree that Kripke’s distinction cannot be made *once* the load distinction *has been* made. Let me explain. Suppose the load distinction for an expression “E” terminates in two readings Y and Z. We have to maintain that Kripke’s distinction, as well, can only be made *from* “E” and not *within* either of Y or Z. This clearly is a necessary condition for the convergence of two distinction. Yet the *prima facie* intuition raised in the last paragraph seems to violate this condition. For my purposes then it will be a sufficient defense of my thesis if I can

show, explicitly, that Kripke's simple/complex distinction can be drawn within the load distinction, preferably in an area far removed from the controversies surrounding proper names and singular definite descriptions. Thus, consider once again

(9) A rogue elephant is causing havoc.

We saw that "A rogue elephant" in (9) can be used either with load or without load. Consider the unloaded use. In the idiolect of the speaker shared by the hearer, the semantic referent of "A rogue elephant" is a rogue elephant. In the simple case, the speaker's specific intention matches his general intention and: he simply wishes to refer to a rogue elephant, whichever it is. In the complex case, however, the specific intention is to refer to the animal, whatever it is, which is causing havoc. The speaker wishes to refer to the animal, whatever it is, but believes that the animal *is* a rogue elephant. If his belief fails, i.e., if a rhinoceros instead of a rogue elephant is causing havoc, then the speaker's referent and the semantic referent will not coincide. We just made the simple/complex distinction within an unloaded use itself for an indefinite description.

But perhaps I am judging Kripke's argument too literally. Perhaps it is possible to attach 'objectively' different background stories, i.e., where the variations in the speaker's intentions is n't the only controlling parameter, to capture Kripke's distinction. I suppose the complex case, as Kripke describes it, is fairly obvious: someone goes to the frontyard, observes someone else raking leaves at a distance, believes that the person over there raking leaves is Jones and utters, 'Jones is raking leaves'. What will be a description of the simple case? Let us suppose that the speaker has the background knowledge that every Sunday afternoon each fall Jones routinely rakes leaves in his frontyard. On a certain Sunday afternoon one such fall, the speaker says, "Jones is raking leaves", without going out to the frontyard - therefore, making an 'objective' difference in the background story - and, thus, without observing a man over there. In saying 'Jones', the speaker simply wishes to refer to Jones since he has no one *else* in mind.

Supposing this to be the simple case, I fail to see how this use of "Jones" is unloaded since, in using 'Jones', a speaker cannot fail to have a particular person, viz., Jones, in mind. Recall that the load distinction crucially depends on whether or not a speaker has a particular object in mind. If this line of reasoning is correct, then, if anything, Kripke's distinction is a distinction within our *loaded* use. This last suggestion, however, has the uneasy consequence, independently of Kripke's argument, that it might be legitimate at least to talk about loaded uses of proper names after all. I return to this point below.

VIII. Loaded Phrases

Let us suppose that proper names, when not viewed as disguised descriptions, are the only plausible candidate-against our thesis. We just saw that one way, Kripke's, of pushing this candidacy fails. Is there some other way?

I suggested earlier that some phrases, e.g., 'The man over there', can only be used in a loaded way.¹² Such exclusive loaded uses must include, as, we saw (section VII), demonstrative phrases such as 'That man' when used as a demonstrative. Suppose we read "That" as something like 'The (over there)' assimilating thus, indexical definite descriptions with demonstratives (Kaplan 1979, Wettstein 1981). This assimilation is controversial (Hawkins 1978: 149-58, Barwise & Parry 198B: 147-7, Fitch 1984 etc.), but since nothing crucial depends on the resolution of this controversy here I will use this assimilation to simplify matters. Syntactically, my principal contrast is between proper names and others. Suppose, in view of the feature that indexical definite descriptions and demonstratives can only have loaded uses, we call them *loaded phrases*. Are proper names loaded phrases as well?

The suggestion that some expressions are loaded phrases can only be made analogically. Thus, we first notice phrases like 'The murderer of Smith' which can be used with or without load. Next, we notice the differences in the conditions of such *dual* use. Finally, we notice that only one of these conditions is available for some phrases. The legitimacy of labelling some phrases "loaded" derives, analogically, from the loaded use of phrases for which dual uses have been found.

What then are the conditions for dual use? So far we have found dual uses for the following: 'The F', 'A F', 'Some F' and 'All F'. Each of these are instances of the general form "(Determiner)". The sources of the dual uses may thus be traced either to the category of determiners or to the "F"s. Let us first consider the determiners.

Finding dual uses for an expression "E" amounts to finding an ambiguity in "E" - whether this ambiguity is semantic or pragmatic is beside the point here (section IV). Thus, if the sources of the dual uses can be traced to the determiners, then we must conclude that the determiners are ambiguous. On the face of it, this clearly is an implausible conclusion. Just in what sense are each of the syncategorematic items 'The', 'A', 'Some' and 'All' ambiguous? Moreover, even if a determiner is sometimes syntactically

ambiguous - e.g., “A” in “A child is a gift of God” and in “A child was born to the Smiths yesterday” - it is easy to see that the load distinction can be made for each of the disambiguated readings though some of the readings may not be very ‘natural’ (section V).

More importantly, in all the phrases for which dual uses have been found so far, the only common factor is “F”. It is surely natural then that the conditions for dual uses can be traced to “F” especially since “F” is a non-logical item. In an unloaded use, a speaker uses an “F” in a general way; in a loaded use, a speaker talks about particular F’s. Thus, it is clear that, since an “F” occurs in both ‘The man over there’ and ‘That man’, we may include both of these phrases as elements of loaded phrases, as defined above, because a speaker always uses them with a particular F in mind. By parity of reasoning, feigned proper names do not contain any “F” as a part of their semantic content, the load distinction does not apply to them.

The following analogy may help us appreciate the preceding methodological point. Kripke has argued at several places that proper names are simply *scopeless* in various contexts.¹³ To say that proper names are scopeless is not to say that there is a linguistic convention that proper names take only the wide scope - the scope *distinction* simply does not apply to proper names. The scope distinction, on the other hand, applies to “Any”-phrases although they take only the wide scope. With respect, to the load distinction, I am urging a similar analysis for “Jones”, on the one hand, where the distinction simply does not apply, and “That man”, on the other, where the distinction applies but the phrase happens to have just the loaded use.

I hope the preceding analysis shows why a fine-grained distinction has to be maintained between proper names and demonstratives because, of the differences in their syntactic structures.

IX. Concluding Remarks

So far I have been trying to make as strong a case as possible for a linguistic phenomenon. The phenomenon is that each variety of descriptive phrase displays a distinction in use and reference that is not displayed by name phrases.

What is the theoretical explanation of this phenomenon? At this stage, unfortunately, I cannot answer this question with a clear and uniform theoretical perspective, for, I apprehend that a number of radical steps in various directions may be required to harness the phenomenon in full. Nevertheless, I will very briefly sketch some of the ways in which a theoretical understanding of the situation may begin. Whatever be the ultimate theory, however, it is already clear that such a theory must be centred around the fact that the presence or the absence of a general term in a noun phrase plays a central role in the total referential function of a phrase.

First, we may think of a general term as our principal resource for achieving what Wettstein (1989) has called a ‘cognitive fix’, i.e., the isolation in thought of a referent (or, better, an area of reference) from the rest of the universe. Further cognitive fixing is facilitated by the various quantifiers/determiners which invariably get attached to a general term to ‘cut’ the isolated area into various shapes and sizes to signal, thereby, a quantity of Fs or some determined Fs (Mukherji 1995).

Secondly, such cognitive fixing may be thought of as serving two distinct purposes which give rise to the load distinction. We may think of the unloaded uses as ‘theory’-talk - general, ‘law-like’ statements of the ways things usually are. Tailored general terms are indispensable tools for this purpose since we would expect such talk to exhibit some stable-general knowledge relating a concept in the subject part with a concept in the predicate part. Thus, (1) exhibits, in the unloaded use, some ‘law-like’ connection between number of planets and oddness;

(1) exhibits some connection between murderers and insanity; (9) between rogue elephants and the havoc they cause, and so on. Loaded uses, on the other hand, do not exhibit such stability of knowledge such that we may view them as saying that a certain F happens to fall under - *satisfies* - such and such a concept. Taking the two uses together, we may view natural languages as eminently efficient tools enabling the same sentence to generate both theory and satisfaction.

To understand the load distinction, then, the focus of research could be directed on the nature of the relation between the two predicates in the subject and the predicate parts. Perhaps Partee (1972:418) had a similar idea in her mind when she remarked that the “prominence of one or the other reading appears to depend on the relation between the significance of the description used in the noun phrase and whatever else is asserted in the sentence”.

Thirdly, and more speculatively, having witnessed the versatility of descriptive phrases in their referential functions, we may begin to wonder whether proper names are referring expressions at all. A first clue to this effect may be found in Kripke’s idea (Kripke 1972) that a definite description may be used to ‘fix the reference’ of a proper name. It is well-known that Kripke used the idea to distinguish between proper names and definite descriptions even when a proper name is *associated* with some definite

description. We may push the idea further with the query, ‘what is the proper name doing if its reference has already been fixed by some other expression of the language?’

Proper names, we have agreed, are mere tags. But tagging is not referring. In the standard, ceremonial, occasions of tagging, we have already referred *by other means* to tag the object. We tag a referred object, we don’t refer by tagging. So, if the task of language, in part, is to enable us to refer, i.e., to achieve a definite cognitive fix, then, if proper names do not have any *other* function, what are proper names doing in a language? Research must find, inside or outside languages, some exclusive function for proper names, a function which is likely to be thinner than the broad notion of a referential function.¹⁴

NOTES

1. By “syntax”, I will throughout mean surface syntax. There are other syntactic frameworks which contribute further to the mixed up picture described below (section II). In a recent interesting work, Homstein (1984) has suggested that, from a certain syntactic point of view, “The”, “Any” and “A certain” and proper names belong to one group while “A”, “Some” and “Every” belong to another. I will not be concerned with such notions of syntax.

2. It may be thought that some classical issues in philosophy of language, e.g., the debate between Russell and Strawson, were reactions to such questions. Both Russell and Strawson agreed that meaning should match syntax; they disagreed about the proper notion of syntax. Russell thought that surface syntax must give way to logical syntax; Strawson thought that surface syntax, i.e., the subject- predicate form, ought to be the decisive constraint. Here we are concerned with a somewhat finer issue, viz., the surface syntax of phrases.

3. Russell’s conception of denoting phrases matches my conception of descriptive phrases by the list *except* for demonstrative phrases. To my knowledge, Russell never supplied any convincing theoretical reasons for his list and the exception.

4. I am not suggesting that such a comprehensive theory of direct reference already exists, though Barwise & Perry (1983), in some ways, comes close. Direct reference so far is mainly an idea guiding several disjoint theories for various expressions. Indeed, one principal exponent of the idea, David Kaplan, does not extend the idea even to proper names; most people, though, include proper names, indexicals and demonstratives. Kaplan’s own ‘D That’ operator, which may be thought of as a direct reference operator, can be attached to definite descriptions to generate singular propositions. In general, I am more concerned with what Kaplan (1989:486) describes as the “pressures” in favor of a semantics of direct reference. These pressures include all the authors I have listed.

5. Suppose there are actually eleven planets. What happens if a person miscounts, as in our example? In general, if a person misuses a description with a particular object in mind, is that use of the description loaded even if the object the description designates is not the object the speaker had in mind? We will see (section V) that this sort of worry leads to the radical features of Donnellan’s referential uses. The crucial item in the worry is the phrase “the object the description designates” commonly understood as standing for the *semantic reference* of the description. Is this notion totally divorced from what the speaker has in mind? *Someone* must have counted, and most of us happen to agree, that there are eleven planets. So, as Kripke (1979) suggests, speaker’s reference grows into semantic reference in time.

6. The load distinction, of course, is primarily inspired by Donnellan’s referential/attributive distinction discussed in some detail below (section V). Another close relative is Barwise & Parry’s distinction (1983:150) between *value-free* and value- loaded interpretations though it is restricted to singular NPs including proper names (although the interpretations, in the case of proper names, are the same). I am not sure if and how they apply the distinction to singular demonstratives. A more interesting general idea seems to underlie Kit Fine’s remark, concerning the *de re/ de dicto* ambiguity: “(Quine) appears to attribute the difference to a lexical ambiguity in the term ‘believes’... But the possibility of a dual reading in this case is an instance of a much more general phenomenon, one in which any sentence containing an appropriately embedded description may be given a *de re* or a *de dicto* reading” (Fine 1989:254). Again, I am not sure about the *extent* of Fine’s general phenomenon.

7. It is of some concern that most of Donnellan’s popular examples involve rather complex descriptive phrases (“The man over there drinking martini”) or are set in tellingly suggestive environment. It is difficult to decide, therefore, whether Donnellan has succeeded in showing that descriptions do not matter *at all*. There are other problems with the notion of referential uses, e.g., we need a cognitive explanation of how it is possible to use a sign successfully without attending to the meaning of the sign.

8. It is clear perhaps why this feature is polemically required by Donnellan. One of the polemical points, quite unnecessary for us, that Donnellan wishes to emphasize in his paper concerns the inadequacies of classical theories of descriptions. In particular, he argued that Russell’s theory cannot account for referential uses although Russell’s theory is quite compatible with attributive uses. Now, without the feature under discussion, Donnellan’s criticism of Russell would be considerably weakened. Russell, we know, cheerfully agrees with various ambiguities in “The”-phrases: proper/ improper, complete/incomplete etc. What Russell needs, at most, is the isolation of a non-empty set of uses where *only* his theory applies. If some definite descriptions can be used only attributively, then Russell’s theory applies there; for those cases, Russell can claim a one-one matching between a sentence and its use. So, Donnellan needs to say that in *every* case a one-two matching is available.

9. It is doubtful, however, whether “A”- phrases permit existential generalisation at all. See Donnellan (1979:36) for more on this. See also the discussion in Strawson (1974:106-11) and Wilson (1978:58) for referential uses of indefinite descriptions. See as well Partee (1972) for some arguments and examples showing that Donnellan’s distinction for indefinite descriptions does not parallel the wide scope/ narrow scope distinction. Some linguists prefer a (Specific) distinction for indefinite descriptions. When viewed as a non-syntactic distinction, this distinction, it seems to me, collapses into the load distinction.

10. Knowing who here does not amount to knowing a person’s name, profession etc. I am using “Knowing who” in the sense of knowing a particular person, in Russell’s sense of being *acquainted* with that person.

11. Notice that Kripke’s argument refutes Donnellan’s claim (Donnellan 1966:282, 303) that there is a parallel between the uses of proper names and the referential uses of definite description since Kripke’s distinction is now drawn *within* proper names. From the semantic point of view, this is a most desirable result. The whole point of holding a Millian view of proper names is to enable us to say that the semantic reference of “The White House” has nothing to do with the semantic reference of “the white house”. Donnellan’s distinction, of course, can be made, on favorable occasions, for “the white house”. Given the (semantic) distance between “The White House” and “the white house” under the Millian view, it seems implausible to hold a parallel between uses of “The White House” and one use of “the white house”. However, I can’t use Kripke’s argument since it threatens my own thesis.

Some authors, e.g., Pollock (1982:108) think that ‘improper’ definite descriptions - such as “The table” - can, in general, only be used referentially. I do not think this is correct but there is no space for constructing suitable counterexamples.

13. I am not recommending Kripke’s point about scopelessness. I am using it only to display the *sort* of analysis I require. The matter is controversial (Hintikka & Kulas 1985). Personally I believe that Kripke is right and that there must be some interesting theoretical connection between the scopelessness and the loadlessness of proper names; but this is not a part of the argument here.

14. Wettstein (1986:193) reports David Kaplan’s idea, reached from very different considerations than mine, that indexicals and demonstratives need to be distinguished from proper names; while proper names are just Millian tags, indexicals and demonstratives have descriptive meanings. Pursuing this convergence of ideas, we may think of Kaplan’s ‘descriptive meanings’ as entities which make the load distinction available for these phrases. Kaplan’s idea raises other questions though; are we or are we not willing to assimilate proper names in the model of direct reference while acknowledging that proper names are mere tags? If indexicals are paradigms for direct reference and if they carry ‘descriptive meanings’, is the theory of indexicals still Millian?

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* This paper does not directly mention the work of Matilal. Yet anyone familiar with his latest work in philosophy of language will find frequent references to the authors and the issues discussed in this paper. Instead of getting into exegetical exercises, I thought that the best way to pay homage to this important thinker is to address and extend the issues themselves.